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Who Is Injured when_Racially Discriminatory 
Private Schools are Tax-Exempt? 
by Neal Devins 
Allen v. Wright 
(Docket No. 81-757) 
Regan v. Wright 
(Docket No. 81-970) 
To be argued February 29, 1984 
ISSUE 
The decision in Bob jones University v. United States did 
not quiet the controversy over tax exemptions for pri-
vate schools. Instead, the Supreme Court's 1983 ruling 
that racially discriminatory private schools are not enti-
tled to tax-exempt status merely paved the way for more 
intricate litigation contouring racial nondiscrimination 
enforcement standards. Regan v. Wright is a nationwide 
class action suit instituted by black parents and their 
schoolage children in an effort to force the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) to adopt more stringent nondis-
crimination standards. The issue now before the Su-
preme Court, however, is a procedural one: whether 
this particular class has an interest in racial nondiscrimi-
nation which satisfies the "standing to sue" require-
ments. 
Article III of the Constitution establishes the basics 
fo,· the judicial power of federal courts and provides 
that the limited federal power extends only to certain 
qualified "case or controversies." Also, standing is an 
essential prerequisite to an article III case or contro-
versy, and without it, the federal courts are constitution-
ally unable to act. The standing doctrine is premised on 
the fundamental separation of powers notion that legis-
lative choices should be made by legislative machinery-
not by the judiciary. In this way, standing prevents a 
plaintiff from using "a federal court as a forum in which 
to air generalized grievances about the conduct of gov-
ernment." (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 ( 1968)) 
Regan v. Wright touches on three specific aspects of 
the standing doctrine. First, since the parents and chil-
dren here have no interest in attending (and have not 
sought admission to) allegedly racially discriminatory 
private schools, Regan will determine whether a black 
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person suffers the requisite .. direct and concrete injury" 
when the government grants tax-exempt statrls to ra-
cially discriminatory private schools. Second, since de-
nial of tax-exempt status might not affect the policies of 
allegedly discriminatory private schools, Regan will de-
termine whether the rights of blacks are vindicated 
merely by the government's .. steering clear" of racially 
discriminatory institutions. Third, Regan will determine 
whether prudential separation of powers concerns 
should prevent the judiciary from imposing standards 
on a matter already addressed by the IRS. 
FACTS 
Regan v. Wright is an appeal by the secretary of trea-
sury and parent of a child attending an allegedly dis-
criminatory private school from a 1981 decision by the 
D.C. court of appeals. That decision gave black parents 
and schoolchildren an absolute right to challenge IRS 
policies governing the tax-exempt status of private 
schools. (Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (1981)) 
The Regan lawsuit is a nationwide class action ini-
tiated in 1976 by black parents and schoolchildren seek-
ing more expansive nondiscrimination enforcement 
standards to govern the tax-exempt status of private 
schools. In an effort to settle the case, the IRS proposed 
nondiscrimination enforcement standards in 1978 
which-in accord with the relief sought in Regan-
would have denied racial nondiscrimination through a 
numerical quota based on areawide black/white student 
population ratios. Congress, however, prohibited these 
procedures through appropriations riders to the Trea-
sury Appropriations Act of 1980. In the meantime, the 
case was working its way through the D.C. district court. 
In November of 1978, that court held that plaintiffs 
Jacked standing to sue. However, in june, 1981, the D.C. 
court of appeals reversed that decision. In May, 1983, 
(immediately following the Supreme Court's Bob .Jones 
University decision), the Supreme Court agreed to review 
the appellate court decision. 
The court of appeals decision adopted the position 
that the black parents and children, as members of the 
group subjected to discrimination, had standing to sue 
to enforce the government's constitutional obligation to 
steer clear of aiding institutions that practice racial dis-
crimination. In support of this holding, plaintiffs in 
Regan argue that 'just as government injures black 
schoolchildren when it operates a segregated system of 
education, it injures those children when it gives signifi-
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cant aid to private discriminatory schools, especially 
those organized or expanded concurrently with deseg-
regation." (See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 
(1973)) Consequently, the parents and children suing in 
this case contend that it is irrelevant that they have not 
been denied admission to any private school. 
The government responds that the "right to be free 
of government aid to racial discrimination is an undiffe-
rentiated right common to all members of the public 
that will not support standing to sue treasury officials in 
an article Ill court." (See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166 (1974)) This governmental position is sur-
facely in accord with the Supreme Court's 1982 decision 
in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State ( 102 S.Ct. 7 52 ( 1982) ). 
According to the Court in Valley Forge, "the psychologi-
cal consequences presumably produced by observation 
of conduct with which one disagrees'' is not "an injury 
sufficient to confer standing under article Ill, even 
though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional 
terms." (102 S.Ct. at 765) The parents and children in 
this case refute this contention, arguing that they are 
especially harmed by the racially discriminatory conduct 
of government. 
The appellate court decision also granted standing 
over the government's contention that the plaintiffs 
failed to stake a claim which could be adequately re-
lieved. The government argued that adopting the pro-
posed nondiscrimination standards might very well have 
the effect of private schools foregoing their tax-exempt 
status (rather than comply with the standards pro-
posed). The government thus argued that Regan was 
quite similar to the situation faced by the Supreme 
Court in its 1976 decision, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization (426 U.S. 26 (1976)). Eastern 
Kentucky denied standing to indigents who complained 
they were being denied medical treatment by hospitals 
that were accorded tax-exempt status. The Supreme 
Court reasoned that it was "purely speculative" to think 
that a change in IRS guidelines would result in concomi-
tant change in hospital policy. 
Black plaintiffs in Regan respond to this argument by 
noting that their claim is not based on an allegation that 
current IRS policies effectively limit their rights to at-
tend desegrated public schools. They instead suggest 
that the injury suffered is that their race is denigrated 
through government support of racial discrimination. 
Consequently, plaintiffs claim that effective nondiscri-
mination enforcement standards will relieve them of 
their government-imposed injury regardless of the ef-
fect of such procedures on the policies of private 
schools. 
The court of appeals decision in Regan also held that 
judicial imposition of nondiscrimination enforcement 
standards would not violate the principle of separation 
of powers. Noting that a temporary injunction issued in 
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this case by the court of appeals prevented the Reagan 
administration from implementing its announced policy 
of granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory 
private schools, black plaintiffs stress that: "The history 
of this case makes plain that, unless the victims of unlaw-
ful government aid to private discrimination have stand-
ing to complain of the injury inflicted by such 
government aid, Brown's promise of equal opportunity is 
hollow." 
In response to this argument, the government sug-
gests that the courts lack authority to serve as "continu-
ing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of executive 
action." For the government: "The questions of revenue 
enforcement policy raised by respondents' suit are pro-
perly a matter of public debate. By that means, the views 
of interested persons and organizations may be venti-
lated and taken into account." On this score, the govern-
ment notes that congressional and public opposition to 
the IRS proposal in 1978 during the Carter presidency, 
was so severe that appropriations riders were passed to 
prohibit such strict standards. 
Supreme Court resolution of Regan will involve the 
same issues presented to the appellate court: 1) whether 
plaintiffs have suffered a concrete injury; 2) whether 
meaningful relief can be granted, and 3) whether pru-
dential separation of powers concerns will prohibit judi-
cial imposition of enforcement standards. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Regan v. Wright is a significant case on a number of 
levels. Of foremost importance, if the Supreme Court 
grants standing, the judiciary will have authority to pro-
mulgate specific nondiscrimination enforcement stand-
ards for tax-exemption organizations. The Bob jones 
University decision did not impose standards; it merely 
held that racially discriminatory private schools will not 
be afforded tax breaks. 
To many observers, the possibility of judicial imposi-
tion of such standards is troublesome. They argue that 
IRS policy is properly based in Congress and the Exec-
utive branch. Although these popularly elected 
branches of government should abide by constitutional 
standards, matters of statutory tax policy should not be 
subject to judicial interference. In the specific context of 
tax-exemptions to racially discriminatory private 
schools, Congress-through the passage of appropria-
tions riders-has explicitly indicated its disapproval of 
standards similar to those proffered by the plaintiffs in 
Regan. 
Some critics also feel that judicial interposition on 
this matter is also problematic because Congress and the 
!RS ar~ ~nstitu~ionally better equipped to make tax pol-
ICY decisiOns. Fmally, court-based policy decisions take a 
long time. The private school tax-exemption issue has 
been in ~he c~urts for fifteen years. And if standing is 
granted m thts case, the issue will probably stay in th(" 
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courts for three to five more years. 
All of this, of course, - the time and sensitivity 
involved in deciding such a case - should not prevent 
the courts from addressing an issue which is properly 
within their jurisdiction. In fact, profound changes 
which occur through Supreme Court decisions can and 
must take place in such troubled atmospheres. 
Regan v. Wright is also significant outside of the tax-
exemption context. If the claim of denigration of the 
race is accepted, blacks will be permitted a special entree 
into the courts when some government policy is at odds 
with the national value of racial nondiscrimination. Al-
though blacks are especially interested in government 
nondiscrimination, this constitutional value is a right 
shared by the entire population. Fundamental separa-
tion of powers concerns (embodied in the standing doc-
trine) should not give way to the claims of special 
interest groups. 
At the same time, blacks are considered the "injured 
party" in school desegregation lawsuits- and blacks are 
undeniably the realistically injured parties when schools 
are desegregated. 
On a broad social level, a strong argument could be 
made that the numerical quota standards proffered by 
plaintiffs in Regan should become part of our tax laws. 
In many areas, private schools have served as a means 
for white children to avoid local desegregation. (The 
great majority of private schools, however, could not 
fairly be called ''segregation academies.") Yet, it is not 
for the courts to interpose statutory standards which 
contradict the apparent will of Congress. 
At this juncture, Regan does not call on the Supreme 
Court to develop or approve nondiscrimination enforce-
ment standards. (The ability of courts to fashion a rem-
edy is a component of the standing doctrine, however.) 
Yet, the Supreme Court is asked in Regan to grant blacks 
a special right to ensure that our government abides by a 
policy of racial nondiscrimination. On the on~ hand, 
blacks have been victimized by illegal segregatiOn. On 
the other hand, none of the black plaintiffs in Regan 
have been directly or specifically victimized by any alleg-
edly discriminatory private schools. 
Striking this balance, with its myriad implications, 
Issue No. 21 
will make Regan a very important Supreme Court deci-
sion. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Black Plaintiffs 
1. The government's grant of tangible financial aid to 
private, racially discriminatory schools formed or ex-
panded in plaintiffs' communities at the initiation of 
public school desegregation infringes plaintiffs' per-
sonal rights to equal educational opportunity,_ 
2. Whether or not any private schools change their poli-
cies as a consequence of government adoption of the 
proposed standards, the injury here should be re-
dressed because the government has ·'steered clear" 
of aiding racial discrimination. 
For the Government 
1. Plaintiffs' allegation that the government provides 
tangible aid to racially discriminatory institutions es-
tablishes no "injury in fact," but only a generalized 
grievance with government policy. 
2. Plaintiffs' allegation that the government interferes 
with their right to equal education opportunity is not 
redressable in court since the practices of private 
schools cannot be fairly traced to government action. 
3. Prudential separation of powers concerns prohibit 
judicial action on this issue. 
(W. Wayne Allen, a parent of a student attending an 
allegedly discriminatory private school, intervened in 
this case and made arguments identical to the govern-
ment. Allen also suggested that the proposed standards 
were not a fair test for racial nondiscrimination.) 
AMICUS ARGUMENTS 
The NAACP filed an amicus brief in support of the 
plaintiffs which contained arguments identical to those 
of plaintiffs. 
The United States Catholic Conference filed a brief 
in support of the government. This brief stressed 
prudential separation of powers limitations on judicial 
action and also urged that government benefits 
accorded private schools through tax-exempt status 
would be nullified should the proposed standards be 
adopted. 
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